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EFFECTS OF LEASES ON PERSONAL FIXTURES
EFFECT OF RENEWAL OF LEASE ON REMOVABLE
FIXTURES.
The effect of the renewal of a lease on the ownership of
fixtures removable under a prior lease, is one which has per-
plexed the Courts of this country for a great many years.
The rules of law on this subject are by no means settled, and
there is a surprising lack of harmony in the decisions of the
Courts of different jurisdictions. It is not the purpose of this
note to attempt to cover the whole field, but particular atten-
tion will be paid to the effect of the renewal of a lease on the
ownership of trade fixtures, since this question probably arises
oftener than any other.
The English rule,' and the rule probably supported by the
weight of authority in this country, is that a tenant who re-
news his lease without removing fixtures placed on the de-
mised premises during the prior tenancy or without reserving
a right to do so in the new lease, even though such fixtures
were removable during the existence of the original tenancy,
can no longer avail himself of that privilege. Such fixtures
have become a part of the freehold and cannot be removed
without the consent of the owner thereof.2 Practically all the
Courts draw a distinction, however, between a renewal lease
which simply incorporates the conditions and terms of a prior
lease, and which is held to be simply a continuation of the
original tenancy, and a renewal lease which is essentially a
new one as to terms and conditions.8 In the former case it is
1. Pronguey v. Gurney, 37 U. C. Q. B. 347.
2. Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Marks v. Ryan, 63 Cal. 107; Hedderich v.
Smith, 103, Ind., 203; Chicago Sanitary District v. Cook, 169 Ill., 184; Shepard
v. Spaulding, 4 Metc. 416; Watriss v. Cambridge First Nat. Bank, 124 Mass. 571;
Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478; Bauernschmidt Brewing Co. v. McColgan, 89 Md.
135; Gerbert v. Sons of Abraham, 59 N. J. L. 160; Loughran v. Ross, 45
N. Y. 792; Precht v. Howard 187 N. Y. 136; Unz v. Price, 27 Ky. 791; Spencer
v. Commercial Co. 30 Wash. 520; Williams v. Lane, 62 Mo. App. 66.
3. Hedderich v. Smith, 103 Ind. 203; Watriss v. Cambridge Nat. Bank 124
Mass., 571; Crandall Investment Co. v. Ulyatt 40 Colo., 35; Estabrook v. Hughs,
8 Neb. 496; Young v, Implement Co. 23 Utah 586; Carlin v. Ritter 68 Md. 478.
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held that the tenant does not lose the right to remove his fix-
tures, while in the latter, the courts which recognize the ma-
jority doctrine hold that, since under the new lease there is a
new tenancy, the tenant by not reserving a right therein to
remove his fixtures, is deemed to have abandoned them as ef-
fectively as if he had withdrawn from the demised premises
without removing them.4
One of the first cases involving this point to be adjudicated
in this country was that of Merritt v. Judd, in which the Court
adopted the English rule. This was an action of replevin to
recover a pump and steam engine used in the operation of a
gold mine. The Court decided that these articles were trade
fixtures, and that there would be no doubt of the right of the
tenant's assignor to recover them, if it were not for the fact
that the tenant had taken a new lease of the premises subse-
quently to making the improvements. The Court said, at
page 72: "Upon the execution of a new lease, he (the tenant)
is in the same position as if the landlord being seized of the
land, had leased both land and fixtures to him."
One of the leading cases in this country is that of Watriss
v. First Nat. Bank of Cambridge.6 This was an action for
breach of a covenant in a lease to quit and deliver up the
premises to the lessor peaceably and quietly at the end of the
term. The breach complained of was the taking down and
removal of a safe and vault, a portable furnace, and certain
counters. Plaintiff and one Hyde owned the premises as ten-
ants in common, and had leased them for five years to the
Harvard Bank with a privilege of renewal for an additional
five years. Under this lease the property in controversy was
placed on the premises. During this tenancy, the Harvard
Bank was reorganized under the present name of the defend-
ant, succeeding to all its rights, and the plaintiff acquired a
sole interest in the premises. Shortly before the expiration of
4. Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478; Lougbran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792.
5. 14 Cal. 59.
6. 124 Mass. 571; 1. c. 575-6.
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this lease the defendant elected to avail himself of the privi-
lege of renewal, and a new lease was dra-wn up, which took
,effect at the expiration of the first. This second lease was
materially different from the first in certain respects. The
new lease contained no reservation of a right to remove the
improvements. At the expiration of the second lease, the de-
fendant attempted to remove them. The Court held that they
were trade fixtures, but denied that they could be removed.
Judge Endicott said: "The general rule is well settled, that
trade fixtures become annexed to the real estate, but the ten-
ant may remove them during his term, and if he fails to do so,
he cannot afterwards claim them against the owner of the land.
* * * But a very different question is presented when the
same tenant continues in possession under a new lease con-
taining different terms and conditions, making no reference to
the old lease, reserving no rights to the lessee in fixtures an-
nexed during the previous term, and not removed before its
expiration * * *. This is not an extension or holding over
under an old lease; it is the creation of a new tenancy and it
follows that whatever was a part of the freehold when the les-
see accepted the new lease inust be delivered up at the end of
the term, and cannot be severed on the groand that it was put
in as a trade fixture under a previous lease which had ex-
pired."
Another leading case is Carlin v. Ritter,7 which contains a
very thorough exposition of the majority doctrine. This case
involved a controversy over the ownership of certain build-
ings erected on the demised premises while the tenant occupied
them under an oral agreement as tenant from year to year.
After having received notice to quit, the tenant secured a
written lease for five years, which contained no reference to
the former tenancy, or to improvements made thereunder. It
was held that the buildings were trade fixtures. Judge Miller,
speaking for the Court, said: "As between landlord and ten-
ant, the property of the latter in fixtures of any description
7. 68 Md. 478; 1. c. 483.
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which he has annexed to the demised premises during his term,
consists simply in the right or privilege of removing them,
and if this is not exercised in due time, they become the prop-
erty of the landlord. In using the term "fixture" we, of
course, use it in its legal senoe, as something so attached to the
realty as to become for the time being a part of the freehold
and as contradistinguished from a mere chattel." Consider-
ing the effect of the new lease the Court said, page 487: "The
question then immediately before us is, what effect had the
acceptance of this lease and comtinuing in possession under it,
upon the tenant's right to remove these trade fixtures. And
here again in answer to this question, all the elementary writ-
ers concur in laying down the proposition that if a tenant
having the right to remove fixtures accepts a new lease of such
premises without reservation or mention of any claim to such
fixtures, and enters upon a new term thereunder, the right of
removal is lost, notwithstanding his possession has been Pon-
tinuous." The reason for this is, that since the fixtuiA% .4et
upon the premises at the time of the lease are a part of ch.e
thing demised, the tenant will be deemed to have abdadoned
them, and by accepting the new lease he acknowleages the
right of the landlord to them.
The doctrine as here outlined, that the acceptance of a new
lease implies an abandonment of them by the tenant and an
acknowledgment of the paramount right of the lessor is fol-
lowed by a great many Courts in this country.8 This rule pre-
serves the fundamental principles of the law of fixturts, that
such improvements become a part of the realty, but that in
the case of trade fixtures, or "removable fixtures," there is a
privilege or license in the lessee to remove them during the
term. By not exercising this privilege, or reserving a right
to do so, he forfeits it and the fixtures which were originally
removable become a permanent part of the realty.
In several instances, while following the majority rule, the
Courts of some States have based their decisions on the con-
8. See cases cited in Note 2.
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struction of covenants in the lease. In Chicago Sanitary Dis-
trict v. Cook,* the Court, while apparently recognizing the
principles of Carlin v. Ritter, supra, based its decision on a
,covenant in the second lease that the lessee would keep the
premises and improvements in reasoi-hle repair, and would
surrender and deliver up the premises in as good condition as
they were at the beginning of the term, reasonable wear and
deteriDration excepted. Since the trade fixtures were on the
premises at the time the new lease was executed, the Court puts
great weight upon this covenant as evincing an intention on the
part of the lessee that the fixtures should become part of the
realty and the right of removal be abandoned. In Davis v.
Carsley Mfg. Co.,"' which presented essentially the same ques-
tion, this principle was reiterated. In Hedderich v. Smith"
the new lease contained a covenant to keep the premises in re-
pair and surrender them in good condition. The Court held
that to allow the lessee to say that the buildings were trade
fixtures and removable would be directly contradicting the
terms of the lease.
In some States this majority doctrine has been repudi-
ated.' 2  Judge Cooley, in Kingsbury v. ierr,' 3 the leading
case on the other side, very strenuously opposed the applica-
tion of the doctrine, and his opinion has been extensively
quoted by those Courts which incline to his views. This case
involved a controversy between a mortgagee and the lessees
of certain property as to whether or not buildings (trade fix-
tures) erected on the demised premises were part of the realty
and included in the mortgage. The contention of the plaintiff
was that the defendant lost the right to remove the buildings
by accepting a new lease of the premises without reserving a
9. 169 I1. 184.
10. 112 11. App. 112.
11. 103 Ind. 203.
12. Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich. 150; Waverly Park Amusement Co. v.
Traction Co., 197 Mich. 92; Daly v. Simonson, 126 Ia. 719; Ray v. Young. 160
Ia. 613; Radey v. McCnrdv. 109 Pa. St. p06; Robinson v. Harr:son 737 Pa. St. 613,
Sassen v. Haegle, 125 Minn. 441; Ogden v. Garrison, 82 Neb. 302.
13. 39 Mich. 150.
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right of removal. Cooley's opinion, which is so frequently
quoted, is in part as follows (page 154): "But why the right
should be lost when the tenant, instead of surrendering pos-
session, takes a renewal of his lease is not very apparent.
There is certainly no reason of public policy to sustain such
a doctrine; on the contrary, the reasons which saved to the
tenant his right to the fixtures in the first place are equally in-
fluential to save to him on a renewal what was unquestionably
his before. What could possibly be more absurd than a rule of
law which should in effect say to the tenant who is about to,
renew: 'If you will be at the expense and trouble, and incur
the loss o2 removing your erections during the term, and of
afterwards bringing them back again, they shall be yours, oth-
erwise you will be deemed to abandon them to your land-
Iord.' " Manifestly, with little regard for authority, the de-
cision is based on public policy and on the assumption that to
hold otherwise would give the lessor an unconscionable advan-
tage. The contention that a lessee who intends to renew his
lease, in order to safeguard his removable fixtures would
have to remove them during the first term, and then have the
trouble of replacing them on the premises after the new lease
began to operate, is obviously absurd. The Courts unani-
mously hold that a lessee may retain his right to remove his
fixtures by putting a reservation to that effect in the new
lease. This case was followed in a later Michigan case, Wa-
verly Park Amusement Co. v. Traction Co., where the opinion
just quoted was cited with approval.
The Courts of Pennsylvania have seized upon this doc-
trine. Radey v. McCurdy,14 Robinson v. Harrison.t In the
first case the Court extensively reviewed the Michigan cases
and adopted them as law. The Court held that there was no
apparent intention to abandon the fixtures, and that it would
be absurd to hold that the lessee would make a gift of them to
his lessor, when clearly no such intention could be imputed
14. 109 Pa. St. 306.
15. 237 Pa. St. 613.
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to him during the first term. In its opinion, however, the
Court speaks of the second lease as substantially embodying
the terms of the first; if so, there was but one tenancy and it
would not be necessary to reserve a right to remove fixtures in
the second lease.
In Iowa the Michigan doctrine has been followed with
somewhat different reasoning. In Ray v. Young,16 the ease
came up on a rehearing as to the granting of an injunction re-
straining the defendant from removing certain buildings from
the demised premises. Such buildings were used solely for
the purposes of trade and could be removed without doing
substantial damage to the freehold. The plaintiff attempted
to invoke the rule that when a lessee takes a new lease of the
premises without making reservations as to fixtures, his right
of removal is lost. The Court directly repudiates such a doc-
trine. It held that trade fixtures, whether buildings or articles
simply annexed to buildings, if they can be removed without
doing substantial injury to the land, are personal property of
the lessee and never lose their character as such. Conse-
quently the theory that when a lessee takes a new lease of the
premises without making any reservations, such lease includes
the land and the fixtures attached thereto at the time of the de-
mise has no application. Since such articles have retained
their character as personal property, they have never become
a part of the realty and so could not pass under a demise of
the land. In Daly v. Simonson 17 the Court held that when
buildings were placed on the premises under a lease which
gave the lessee a right to remove them at the expiration of
his term, they were personal property, and that notwithbstand-
ing that in a new lease he covenanted to keep them in repair,
and made no reservation for their removal, they never lost
their character as personal property, nor the lessee his right
of removal.
16. 160 Ia. 613.
17. 126 Ia. 719.
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The principles of the Iowa cases are followed in Minnesota
and Nebraska.18 This doctrine really begs the whole question
of fixtures. By definition a fixture is a chattel so attached to
the realty as to become for the time being a part of the free-
hold.19 When so attached it loses its character of personalty,
there being the power in the lessee, however, to convert it
again into personalty by exercising his privilege of severance.
If an article never loses its character as personal property, it
never becomes a "removable fixture," although some courts
through a loose use of terminology have in effect so held.
There is, however, a growing tendency in the courts, which is
clearly marked, to regard articles annexed for the purposes
of trade, which can be severed from the realty without doing
substantial damage to the freehold, as personal property. In
a late Missouri case 20 trade fixtures were held to be personal
property.
In New York, Missouri and Kentucky,' 1 the Courts have
grafted an exception in favor of certain classes of trade fix-
tures onto the majority rule.
In New York, in the early case of Loughran v. Ross, 22 the
Court held, in conformity with the majority rule, that when a
lessee who has a right to remove fixtures under a lease, takes a
new lease of the premises without reservations, such lease will
include the fixtures and he will be deemed to have abandoned
them notwithstanding his possession has been continuous. In
a later case, Lewis v. Ocean Navigation & Pier Co.,23 the Court
held that the rule laid down in Loughran v. Ross was a harsh
one and should not be extended to a case where the lessee
simply remains in possession after the expiration of his lease
18. 125 Minn. 441; 82 Neb. 302.
19. Carlin v. Ritter, 68 Md. 478.
20. Cunningham v. Von Mayes, 194 Mo. App. 56.
21. Bernheimer v. Adams, 70 App. Div. 113. Affirmed without opinion
175 N. Y. 472; Thomas v. Gayle, 134 Ky. 330; Red Diamond Clothing Co. v.
Steideman, 169 Mo. App. 306.
22. 45 N. Y. 792.
23. 125 N. Y. 341.
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in his character as tenant, where there has been no acceptance
of a new lease.
In Bernheimer v. Adams24 the Court held that the articles
in question which were attached as trade fixtures, were not in
their nature, nor were they so attached as to become, neces-
sarily a part of the freehold, since they could be removed with-
out doing material injury. The Court, through Judge Laugh-
lin stated: "We think no rule of law or public policy requires
in these circumstances that the tenants * * * should lose
their rights by a failure to specify in the lease that a right of
removal was reserved, and such doctrine would be most in-
equitable. We deem the true rule to be, that if fixtures are
distinctively realty, the right to remove must be reserved in
the lease. The right to remove fixtures which are distinc-
tively realty is in the nature of a license and must be exercised
while the tenant is in possession under the lease that granted
it. Taking a new lease without reserving the right is deemed
an abandonment thereof."
In Thomas v. Gayle2 5 and Bergh v. Herring-Hall-Marvin
Safe Co.,28 substantially the same doctrine is adhered to. In
the latter case, the articles in question were certain engines,
boilers, shafting, pulleys, etc., which were trade fixtures.
Judge Coxe, in referring to Bernheimer v. Adams, supra,
said: "The Court makes a distinction which we think is a
proper one, between fixtures which are distinctively realty
such as buildings, fences, bank vaults and the like, and chat-
tels known as trade fixtures which are capable of being re-
moved without injury to the freehold. With this distinction
observed no injustice can be done. If the fixtures are appurte-
nant to the land so that a deed or lease of the premises will
necessarily include them, a reservation should be made if the
tenant desires to retain them, but as to chattels which can be
removed and carried away without injury, no such exception
should be necessary."
24. 175 N. Y. 472.
25. 134 Ky. 330.
26. 136 Fed. 368.
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In a line of authorities beginning with Williams v. Lane,27
the courts of Missouri have adhered to the doctrine of aban-
donment. In that case the lessor of a building brought'an ac-
tion of waste against the lessee for removing certain shelving
which had been affixed to the premises under a prior lease.
The articles in question were held to be trade fixtures, but
the Court held that since they were not removed during the
original term, that by the acceptance of a new lease they had
become an integral part of the real estate to which they were
affixed.
In a late case, however, Red Diamond Clothing Co. v.
Steideman,28 the Court inclined to the New York view and
drew a distinction between trade fixtures which were in their
nature distinctively personal and those which were distinc-
tively a part of the realty. In this case there was an action
brought for the conversion of certain property annexed to de-
fendant's building. The articles in question were an engine,
boiler, steam pump and blow-off tank, all parts of a manu-
facturing plant, and a furnace and automatic sprinkler. All
this property had been annexed to the demised premises un-
der an oral agreement that the lessee should have the right of
removal after the expiration of his first term. At the expira-
tion thereof, said lessee took a new lease without making any
reservations as to the improvements. The Court held that as
far as the furnace and automatic sprinkler were concerned,
they could not be removed, for because of the mode of annexa-
tion, they could not be taken off without doing substantial in-
jury to the building. Since they were not trade fixtures, they
had become a part of the realty. The Court decided that the
other articles in question were trade fixtures and could be re-
moved without doing substantial injury to the freehold. That
notwithstanding the decision in Williams v. Lane, supra, the
rule there laid down was a harsh one and should not be ex-
27. 62 Mo. App. 66; Champ Spring Co. v. Roth Tool Co., 103 Mo. App.
103; St. Louis v. Nelson, 108 Mo. App. 210.
28. 169 Mo. App. 306.
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tended to a case like this where the trade fixtures never be-
came essentially a part of the realty, but have retained their
character as personal property. Thus it can be seen, that on
this question the Courts of Missouri hold to practically the
same doctrine which prevails in New York.
When confronted with hard cases, Courts frequently hesi-
tate in applying fixed rules of law. Manifestly, the exceptions
made in Missouri, New York and Kentucky in favor of trade
fixtures, are for the purpose of aiding and stimulating indus-
try. The great difficulty is to determine just what the cri-
terion will be by which the Courts will pronounce certain trade
fixtures "distinctively personalty" and others "distinctively
realty."
It is clear that there has been of late years a drifting away
from the old doctrine. Whether these changes are based on
public policy, whether on the character of the improvements
as personal property where a right of removal once existed,
or whether they are based on the doctrine as it apparently ex-
ists in Missouri, the changes, made undoubtedly in the inter-
ests of commerce and industry, have introduced a confusion
into the body of the law from which it will be difficult for the
Courts to extricate themselves.
F. P. ASCHEMEYER, '24.
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